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FOREWORD 
This executive summary contains the main analyses and recommendations of an extensive 
study of the size, structure and competitiveness of the EC automotive components industry. 
The study addressed the key structural changes and competitive strategies necessary to 
strengthen the competitiveness of the EC industry. It was carried out by the Boston 
Consulting Group (BCG) and PRS Consulting International during 1990. 
The study investigated components for passenger car and light commercial vehicles less 
than 3.5 tonnes and covered parts both for original equipment and replacement. Product 
groups covered were the fuel system, cooling system, internal engine components, exhaust 
system, transmission and other drivetrain, suspension, steering, body and external parts, 
interior trim, bnkes and electrical componentry. Paint, adhesives, fasteners, 
communications equipment, tyres, unfinished components and materials, accessories, care 
products were excluded from detailed analysis. 
The study is based on approximately 150 face-to-face interviews with European component 
companies, all the major European vehicle manufacturers, a number of Japanese and US 
component and vehicle manufacturers, and experts and industry institutions in Europe, the 
US and Japan. Additionally, a survey based on a mailed questionnaire was carried out. 
More than 400 completed questionnaires were analysed and used to quantify insights 
gained from in-depth interviews. 
The detailed results of the study are included in two volumes which have been handed over 
to the Commission of the European Community. Results of the study were presented to the 
Commission, CLEPA, CCMC and CLCA in the course of three formal presentations of 
one day each, in addition to informal meetings with the EC authorities and industry 
organisations. 
The appendix to this summary contains the main conclusions of an additional study on the 
automotive components industry of Eastern Europe carried out by the Boston Consulting 
Group on behalf of the Directorate General for Internal Market and Industrial Affairs . 
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INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
The present study examines the size, structure, competitiveness, and main trends affecting 
the EC automotive components industry, including the Single European Market, 
technology, competitive position, policy environment and recent developments in Eastern 
Europe. The study covers not only diagnosis but also develops strategic and operational 
guidelines for improving the competitive position of the European industry. 
The study consists of six main aspects: 
Sizing of EC automotive components demand and supply, 
Analysis of industry structure, 
Analysis of financial performance, 
Analysis of competitiveness, 
Analysis of key industry trends, 
Development of policy and strategic guidelines to improve competitiveness. 
The recommended measures to improve competitive position have been based on an 
investigation of the structural and operational determinants of competitiveness and the 
current position of producers in the EC relative to key competitor countries in the main 
product areas. This study is addressed to component companies, vehicle manufacturers, the 
authorities of the European Community and industry institutions. It aims at providing 
guidelines for: 
Actions to be taken by component firms and the vehicle manufacturers, 
Actions to be taken at industry level by its institutions, 
Supporting policies. 
The following sections summarise the main diagnoses and conclusions of the study. For 
full details, the two accompanying volumes should be consulted . 
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INDUSTRY SIZE 
The previously existing published statistics on the size of the EC automotive components 
industry present a number of serious problems including incomplete coverage, inconsistent • 
definitions, double counting, and confusion regarding price levels. Given such problems, 
an analytical approach was adopted for quantifying and forecasting component 
consumption, production, value-added and employment, based on explicit assumptions 
(derived from interviews and empirical data) on each element of demand. The chart below 
outlines the approach taken. 
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Car and light commercial vehicle (LCV) production values are based on production volume 
and price data. Component demand for original equipment vehicle manufacture (OE 
demand) was estimated from vehicle production value using information about venical 
integration and production cost structure obtained from vehicle manufacturer interviews and 
other data. 
Replacement component demand (RE demand) is relatively well documented in some EC 
countries. Demand in other EC countries was modelled by adjusting for country differences 
not only in pare size, but also pare age structure, average annual milage, accident rates, and 
the strictness of compulsory vehicle testing. Replacement market demand was assumed to 
consist of three elements driven by accidents, testing and mileage. Their relative 
magnitudes were derived from unpublished automotive insurance data, vehicle testing 
statistics and other sources. 
From total component comsumption demand were derived production, value added and 
employment using EC trade data, labour productivity and value added statistics. 
EC component production, consumption and value added were estimated at ECU 79 Bn, 
• 
71 Bn and 33 Bn respectively, all expressed in 1988 values. Replacement market demand • 
• 
• 
• 
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was calculated at 24% of total autocomponent consumption. Employment was calculated at 
950,000 or 2.6 % of total EC industrial employment: 
INDUSTRY SIZING 
1988 Independent Autocomponents Production, Value Added, Consumption 
and Employment by Country 
Production Value Added Consum :>tion Emolovment 
Countrv ECU 88 Bn % ECU 88 Bn % ECU 88Bn % 'OOO % 
Gennany 30.6 39.0 14.5 44.3 23.5 33.l 329.l 34.6 
France 16.9 21.5 5.7 17.3 15.2 21.5 168.7 17.8 
Italy 11.l 14.1 4.5 13.7 9.2 13.0 138.5 14.6 
Spain 8.8 11.2 3.6 10.9 9.3 13.1 147.1 15.5 
UK 8.2 10.5 3.3 10.2 9.1 12.8 132.6 14.0 
Belgium/ 
1.4 1.8 0.6 l. 7 2.0 2.9 13.8 1.5 Luxembourg 
Holland 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.5 1.2 1.7 3.8 0.4 
Denmark 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.4 5.1 0.5 
Portugal 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.8 7.0 0.7 
Greece 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 3.0 0.3 
Ireland ..JU ..JU _ill! ..JU ..JU ..JU _Ll. _QJ_ 
Total 78.5 100.0 32.7 100.0 70.9 100.0 950.0 100.0 
Five countries (Gennany, France, Italy, Spain and UK) account for over 90% of total 
production, value added, consumption and employment. 
Germany's importance within the EC autocomponent industry is even greater than in 
vehicles; it accounts for 35% of vehicle production but 39% of component production, and 
44% of value-added given the generally greater technological content of Gennan 
production. These figures exclude the impact of Gennan unification which has clearly 
further enhanced Gennany's dominance. 
Production and consumption are comparable with the upper range of previous estimates 
although the proportion attributable to the replacement market is somewhat smaller at 24%. 
Previous estimates may have exaggerated replacement market demand by incompletely 
excluding service and accessories and by comparing replacement market demand at retail 
price levels with OE demand at producer price levels. 
Employment is somewhat higher than previous estimates, especially in Gennany, Italy and 
Spain due perhaps to industry fragmentation and related data gathering problems . 
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The study analysed OE and replacement market consumption and production by the main 
component groups. The results are shown in the following table: 
INDEPENDENT AUTOCOMPONENTS PRODUCTION AND 
CONSUMPTION BY COMPONENT TYPE 
Production Consumption 
Type (ELU 88 Bn) ( % ) (t.:CU 88 Bn) (%) 
Body 14.2 18.1 13.2 · 18.6 
Electrical 12.3 15.6 12.1 17.1 
Internal engine 9.2 11.8 7.7 10.9 
Interior 8.5 10.8 8.3 11.7 
Transmission 2.3 3.0 1.9 2.6 
Other drive train 5.7 7.3 5.5 7.8 
Brakes 5.0 6.4 4.5 6.4 
Suspension 4.7 5.9 4.6 6.5 
Wheels 4.3 5.5 4.0 5.6 
Fuel 3.4 4.4 2.8 3.9 
Engine cooling 2.6 3.3 1.9 2.7 
Exhaust 2.6 3.3 2.4 3.5 
Other* 1.8 2.3 - -
Total 78.5 100.0 70.9 luu.O 
* Arising from residual categories in trade statistics 
These size estimates relate to the independent autocomponents industry; it excludes 
components for commercial vehicles above 3.5 tonnes, the component subsidiaries of 
vehicle producers, component production at the site of vehicle assembly and also materials 
• 
and processing industries supplying the components and vehicle producers. An attempt • 
was made to place the independent components industry within a wider auto industry 
context. The diagram below shows that the independent autocomponents industry accounts 
for approximately 21 % of total value added by the automotive industry (excluding vehicle 
distribution and repair). 
THE INDEPENDENT COMPONENTS INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTES 
APPROXIMATELY 21% OF THE TOTAL VALUE ADDED BY THE 
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
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Employment in the i!1dependent components industry is estimated at 950,000, representing 
38%. ~f !Otal auto industry employment. Including autocomponent production within 
subs1d1anes and plants of vehicle producers, employment is estimated at over 1.6 million or 
more than 4% of total EC industrial employment. Total automotive industry related 
employment, including car assembly itself (approximately 90,000), materials, and 
processing industries, is estimated at roughly 2.5 million. 
Forecast 
The approach taken to forecasting industry growth is illustrated below. OE demand was 
derived from vehicle production forecasts and predictions about changes in vehicle 
manufacturers' level of venical integration obtained from interviews. Replacement market 
demand was calculated from forecast pare growth and assumptions about changes in 
component durability and convergence in the vehicle testing requirements of EC countries. 
Production and employment forecasts were obtained from consumption forecasts using 
trade balance and labour productivity growth projections. (No allowance was made for the 
impact of developments in Eastern Europe, which are described in a separate repon.) 
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Over the next five years, component production and consumption are forecast to grow on 
average at 2.7% per annum in real terms (net of inflation). This is faster than the projected 
vehicle production growth of 1.6% pa, the difference being attributable to a reduction in the 
degree of vertical integration forecast by EC vehicle manufacturers, resulting in greater 
purchases from EC independent component producers. 
Replacement market demand is forecast to decline at 0.9% pa in real terms due to assumed 
improvements in component quality and reliability, based on component manufacturer 
interviews and analysis of historical trends in component durability. 
Employment is forecast to decline at 1.3% pa compound due to improvements in labour 
productivity (5.4% pa) within the range of historical productivity improvements and 
necessitated by increased competition with Japanese companies. 
6 
Growth forecasts were tested for sensitivity to changes in major assumptions. Forecast 
market growth is most sensitive to assumptions about changes in the level of vertical 
integration by vehicle manufacturers, that is the proportion of sales outsourced and the 
proportion of the same which is independently outsourced. Changes in industry boundaries • 
are the most critical determinant of independent component sector growth. 
Given the relatively small proportion of total component consumption accounted for by 
compulsory vehicle testing, growth forecasts are relatively insensitive to changes in 
assumptions concerning the strictness and nature of testing requirements. Even major 
harmonisation of testing requirements across countries to the strictest levels in the EC 
would not have a large impact on autocomponent growth. 
Forecast growth is only moderately sensitive to changes in assumptions concerning 
increased component durability growth. Forecast consumption and production decline by 
0.2% for each 10% increase in component durability assumed over the 5 year period. 
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
The analysis of the structure of the EC autocomponents industry both provides insights into 
the competitiveness of the component industry and the entire vehicle value chain. 
Comparable statistics across countries are not available from public sources. This required 
the use of a variety of sources and approaches to determine the structure of the industry. 
Data sources included national statistics, trade associations, the International Labour Office, 
published industry studies, the European Commission, and PRS databases. 
In the following paragraphs the structure of the European industry is analysed in terms of 
company structure, regional concetration, degree of vertical and horizontal integration and • 
the nature and number of direct suppliers to the vehicle manufacturers, and ownership and 
foreign investment. 
Company Structure 
The number of independent component companies in the European Conununity is estimated 
at 3,250, with the break-down b coun shown below: 
*1988 
Country 
Italy ..,.------... ~~--" 1000 
W Germany ""!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!~~~ 600 Spain..,_ ____ _,, 450 
France UK .,.,. ___ _,. 
Belgium....___ 
Portugal 
Holland 
Ireland 
Greece 
Denmark 
Luxembourg 
0 200 400 600 800 1 ooc 1200 
No. of companies 
Source: Government Statistics, Trade Associations, PRS Ar.al sis 
TOTAL: 3,250 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Analysis of employment concentration indicates that companies with over I ,OOO employees 
account for nearly 50% of total employment whilst 35% are employed by companies of less 
than 500, the definition of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in the EC that are 
potential recipients of a number of Community policy initiatives . 
EC OVERVIEW OF TOTAL AUTOCOMPONENT EMPLOYMENT SHOWN 
BY EMPLOYEE SIZE BANDS 1988 
% of employment 
<100 101-500 501-1000 >1001 
Employee size bands 
Source: Government Statistics, Trade Associations, PRS Analysis 
D Rest of Euro 
D UK 
o France 
• Spain 
I WG 
I ltal 
Companies with employment in excess of 1,000 people, which account for almost half of 
total industry employment, are relatively few in the EC ( 138), whilst the number of 
companies in the size band below I 00 employees is more than 2000. 2,900 companies fall 
under the definition of SMEs. 
EC OVERVIEW OF ESTIMATED NUMBER OF AUTOCOMPONENT 
COMPANIES SHOWN BY SIZE BANDS 
300 
Number 
of companies 2,089 
200 
<100 
Total no. of companies = 3,252 
192 
c Rest of Europe 
C UK 
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• WG 
• Italy 
138 
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Source: Government Statistics Trade Associations PRS Anal sis 
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There are significant differences in the industry structure of the key producer countries. 
Whilst West Gennany, France and the UK are relatively concentrated, Italy and Spain 
show a greater degree of fragmentation. Two-thirds of West Gennan component industry 
employment is in companies with more than 1,000 employees: 
WEST GERMAN AUTOCOMPONENT EMPLOYMENT SHOWN BY 
EMPLOYEE SIZE BANDS 1988 
80 
% of employment 
60 
40 
20 
0 
Percent of nurrcer 
of con,ianies 
Source: VDA/PRS Analvsis 
45% 8% Total: 600 
con,ian,es 
West Gennany has the highest employment concentration in the top size band (65% of the 
employees are in 8% of the number of companies). Eight West Gennan companies 
(Bosch, Teves, ZF, VDO, Behr, Siemens Bendix, Fichtel & Sachs, and Hella) are 
amongst the top 20 suppliers in the EC ranked by automotive sales. All are world leaders 
in specific product areas and have a strong presence in '1igh technology sectors such as 
electronics and transmissions. 
• 
Similarly, 60% of employment in the UK and 59% in France is accounted for by the 7% of • 
companies in each country with over 1,000 employees. The UK has a relatively high 
number of major EC autocomponent companies (Lucas, GKN, Pilkington, BBA, T &N 
and BTR) which reflects strength in traditional automotive areas and the shake out of 
smaller companies in the early 1980s. 30% of UK and 27% of French employment is 
concentrated in Sl\1Es. 
Italy and Spain, however, have a very different industry structure: around half of the 
employment is accounted for by small and medium sized enterprises. SMEs account for 
94% of the total number of enterprises in Italy and 46% of employment. 
ITALIAN AUTOCOMPONENT EMPLOYMENT SHOWN BY EMPLOYEE 
SIZE BANDS 1988 
Source: Anfia/PRS Anal sis 
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~h~ Italian industry structure, is skewed, however, since the large company sector is 
lmuted to a "!ery sm_all number of companies. Fewer than 1 % of Italian companies, chiefly 
the Magnetti Marelh Group, account for 29% of total employment in the sector . 
The proponion of employment concentrated in SMEs in Spain is slightly higher than that of 
Italy at 50%. Alt~ough the top 3% of Spanish enterprises account for approximately one 
quarter of Spanish employment, there are no dominant Spanish suppliers. Larger 
companies tend to be foreign-owned subsidiaries. The largest companies are FEMSA 
(Bosch, WG), Bendix Espana (US) and United Technologies MAI (US). 
The top 20 autocomponent companies in the EC, ranked by automotive turnover, are given 
in the following table: 
Company 
:'\ame 
I. Bosch 
2. Valeo 
3. Magnetti Marelli 
4. GM-ACG (Europe) 
5. Lucas Automotive 
6. GK\'. 
7. Teves 
8. Pilkington 
9. BBAGroup 
10. T&.'l 
1 I. Allied-Signal• 
12. ZF 
13. VDO 
14. BTR 
IS. Hutchinson 
16. Behr 
17. Siemens (Bendix) 
18. EaA 
19. Fichtel & Sachs 
20. Hella 
• Exel udes Bendu Electronics 
Source: PRS Analysis 
Autocomponent 
Turnover 
ECL' m (1988) 
3421 
2340 
1950 
1669 
1810 
1645 
1173 
1149 
1042 
95S 
918 
896 
771 
675 
647 
542 
762 
511 
476 
470 
Percentage Country of 
Automotive ultimate 
Comuonents ownership 
54 W Gennany 
100 France 
100 Italy 
100 VSA/France 
100 lK 
58 lK 
100 USA/W Gennany 
33 lK 
69 lK 
61 lK 
38 l5 
39 WGennany 
80 WGennany 
64 lK 
46 France 
100 WGermany 
3 WGermany 
100 France 
70 WGennany 
70 WGennanv 
These 20 companies account for approximately 25% of total EC autocomponent 
employment. The activities of the top 20 companies reflect the European lead position in 
automotive electronics, brakes, fuel systems and transmissions. Three of the top 20 are 
closely associated with major OEMs (Magnetti Marelli, ACG and ECIA). 
The rest of Europe has very few large companies. Those with over 1,000 employees are 
Solvay (Belgium), Cablesa (Ponugal), Philips Lighting and the Hoogovens Group 
(Holland) and Roulands (Denmark). 
The smaller supplier countries have- a greater single product focus with a tendency to 
specialise in electrical products and wiring harnesses in panicular (eg Ireland and Portugal), 
reflecting factor cost positions and regional investment incentives. 
Regional concentration and location 
36% of total autocomponents employment is estimated to be in regions eligible for 
Community souctural action, with 6% of this under objective 1 and 5% under objective 2: 
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EC AUTOCOMPONENT EMPLOYMENT BY REGIONS ELIGIBLE FOR 
COMMUNITY STRUCTURAL ACTION 
Country Objective 1 Objective 2 Objective 3 Total % of employment in 
Totally Partially areas eligible for 
eligible elisrible structural action 
Spain 17.0 12.0 90.0 119.0 100% 
UK 2.0 16.0 44.5 62.5 52% 
Italy 9.0 
- 32.0 41.0 32% 
France - 3.0 34.0 37.0 25% 
WGermany - 14.0 12.0 26.0 8% 
Ponugal 15.0 - - 15.0 100% 
Ireland 6.6 - - 6.6 100% 
Belgium - 0.2 3.0 3.2 19% 
Holland - - 2.5 2.5 28% 
Greece 1.0 - - 1.0 100% 
Luxembourg 
- - 0.2 0.2 100% 
Denmark - - 0.06 0.06 2% 
Total 50.6 45.2 218.2 314.0 :35% 
Areas eligible for Community structural action typically correspond to those regions with 
little vehicle manufacture or with assembly operations only (eg Ireland and Ponugal). The 
main areas of vehicle assembly concentration which attract considerable component 
industry concentration tend to be outside the areas eligible for regional funds: West 
Germany, Paris, Turin. On the other hand Spain, Southern Ponugal and Italy have key 
components industries in areas covered by objectives I and 2. 
OEM component purchasing is currently highly nationally focused. Mercedes Benz, for 
example, purchases 90% of outsourced components domestically, Volkswagen 80% and 
Fiat 88%. A number of factors are likely to reduce the current tendency towards domestic 
purchasing, such as the reorganisation of OEM purchasing functions on an European basis, 
the increased establishment of vehicle and component manufacture in Southern 
Europe allowing Nonhem European assemblers to take advantage of lower labour costs 
and investment incentives, and improved infrastructure. 
The 1992 programme will facilitate Europeanisation of purchasing generally through 
reduced transport cost (savings of up to 20% are likely from transport deregulation and 
elimination of border formalities) and the elimination of bureaucratic obstacles. OEMs and 
component manufacturers generally do not believe that the 1992 programme in itself will 
lead to major changes in their location decisions as relates to their manufacturing 
operations. This is because those factors leading to greater Europeanisation of purchasing 
are often counterbalanced by the trend toward greater use of just-in-time systems, which 
favours close proximity of component companies to vehicle assembly plants. The Single 
Market programme is however changing companies' policies in aftermarket distribution 
structures substantially, with a number of vehicle producers rationalising their logistics 
systems on a Pan-European basis. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Vertical integration and car assembler relationships 
Industry structure assumes significance in determining industry competitiveness when the 
entire value chain is analysed. Two elements are crucial: 
• Value added by component companies vs car assemblers: 
• The number of direct suppliers to car assemblers. 
The first element is critical in reducing management complexity and costs at the OEM level 
and in concentrating R&D and logistics skills with strong component suppliers, capable of 
sustaining a major R&D eff on. Greater value added at the component supplier level often 
implies that car manufacturers outsource assembled component subsystems or systems, 
giving significant advantages in supplier management. As is illustrated in the table below, 
EC car manufacturers typically have a higher degree of vertical integration than Japanese 
OEMs, panicularly if component divisions and subsidiaries are taken into account. On 
average, value added as a percentage of sales in European OEMs is 46% without 
component subsidiaries and 56% including them, whilst Japanese OEMs are far less 
vertically integrated with only 36% of total value added (the effective level of integration in 
Japan may be somewhat higher given financial affiliation and close operational coordination 
with key suppliers): 
DEGREE OF OEM VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
OEM Value added/sales % Value added/sales 'fo including 
component divisions 
Fiat 36 51 
VAG 60 60 
Renault 55 60 
Ford 40 55 
GM 40 65 
Mercedes 50 51 
PSA 45 53 
Honda 42 -
Mazda 32 
Toyota 38 
Nissan 34 
Somce: PRS/BCG interviews 
The second key structural variable is the number of direct suppliers to assemblers. One of 
the key structural differences between the European and the Japanese industry is the fact 
that Japanese assemblers have a much smaller number of direct suppliers. As shown 
below. European volume car companies have between 800 and 2000 direct suppliers, 
whilst Japanese OEMs have between 160 and 300 direct suppliers. EC OEMs are gradually 
reducing their number of direct suppliers by reducing the number of suppliers per pa.rt and 
increasing the number of parts supplied by individual suppliers, but have still a 
significantly higher number of direct suppliers than the main Japanese car manufacturers . 
Number of direct 
suppliers 
Source: PRS/BCG Interviews 
3000 
12 
Europe Japan 
The greater level of concentration of component suppliers with direct contacts with the 
vehicle manufacturers does not necessarily imply a radical reduction in the number of 
independent component producers. Many will survive as second or third tier suppliers to 
the component producing complete systems or subsystems. 
The advantage of a lower number of direct suppliers is again in simplification of 
management, coordination and increased responsibility of component suppliers to: 
• Supply a larger number of components per component company; 
• Supply assembled component systems and subsystems instead of a large number of 
individual components; 
• Carry a more significant R&D eff on; 
• Play a key role in sub-supplier management (as first tier suppliers). 
The advantages of this specific structural feature are discussed later in the sections dealing 
with competitiveness and strategies for its improvement, where the connection between 
structural and competitive factors is also highlighted. 
A tendency towards increased outsourcing from a reduced number of suppliers in Europe is 
likely and will tend to increase the degree of concentration of the component industry. OEM 
strategies to reduce the number of suppliers will imply fewer direct supply opportunities 
encouraging concentration. Design delegation will mean a heavier R&D burden for 
component suppliers which requires critical mass/economies of scale at the component 
producer level. Increased systems purchasing will require the mastery of a broader number 
of technologies and will lead to major suppliers building 'systems' portfolios. As argued 
later, the technology content of componentry is likely to increase which implies higher 
R&D intensity to compete in a mature market Fledgling Europe wide purchasing policies 
of OEMs may require multicountry presence and favour increased concentration in a 
number of component areas. 
The greater level of concentration of component suppliers with direct contacts with the 
vehicle manufacturers does not necessarily imply a radical reduction in the number of 
independent component producers. Many will survive as second or third tier suppliers to 
the component companies producing complete systems or subsystems. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Ownership and forei~ investment 
The st1;1dy funhermore investigated the structure of component company ownership in the 
EC usmg a representative sample. 35% of enterprises in of our sample were foreign-
owned: 
Number of 
companies 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
Germany: 
Franca UK 
AMPLE 
Ownership origin 
CJ USA 31% 
Cl Japan 5% 
•c w Germany 
•£g France 
·- Italy 
•• UK 
•• Otl'lerEC 
21% 
11% 
IS% 
17% 
10% 
• outaide naoonal markets 
Sample o,ze 300 1'3 200 151 1611 70 <13 56 26 ,o 
Oomeohc-owned 236 78 127 107 112 <16 31 22 1" 8 
Sampteu%ot 
total amp1oyees 110 72 M 82 u 78 7<& ,oo 72 83 
Source: Trade Associations, PRS Analvsis 
The table shows - based on our sample - that West German companies are the main 
investors in the EC outside their domestic markets among EC countries. There is a high 
proponion of German-owned companies in Spain explained by the fact that component 
manufacturers followed VW, GM, and Ford there to supply them and take advantage of 
lower labour costs and investment incentives. The US is the key extra-European country 
which has established or acquired companies in the EC 
The likely pattern and significance of Japanese autocomponent investment in the EC were 
explored in discussions with Japanese and EC component and vehicle manufacturers. The 
pattern of investment in the USA and the likelihood of its repetition were also examined. 
Japanese component producers rapidly followed Japanese vehicle manufacturers in 
establishing manufacturing bases in the US; by 1989 more than 800 companies had done 
so. A variety of factors drove this wave of US investment. The appreciation of the yen 
against the dollar made both car and component exports to the US increasingly unattractive. 
Japanese component manufacturers faced a potential stagnation of demand with car expons 
substituted by US transplant production, as vehicle manufacturers bowed to pressure to 
moderate expons and localise production. Japanese vehicle producers actively encouraged 
Japanese component producers to invest in the US. Given the high levels of venical 
integration of US car producers much componentry was unobtainable from the independent 
sector. Local availability problems were panicularly acute for small car components and 
were exacerbated by poor quality and cost performance relative to Japanese producers. 
Aftermarket opportunities resulting from the large Japanese vehicle pare in the US and 
established distribution channels were also a factor encouraging investment in the US by 
Japanese component producers. 
Many of the factors mentioned above might also apply to the EC. Trade friction has given 
rise to Japanese car export stagnation through national quotas and "voluntary export 
restraints". Fears of "Fortress Europe" post-1992 have fuelled the establishment of 
Japanese transplants within the EC. 
However, in many key respects the investment environments in the EC and US differ 
markedly for Japanese component producers. The indigenous European independent 
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component industry is larger than that of the US due to a lower level of vehicle producer 
vertical integration and arguably more competitive along a number of dimensions as will be 
discussed later. 
Politically, trade friction has been supplemented by a growing sensitivity to "investment • 
friction" and Japanese vehicle companies perceive pressure to source from established local 
suppliers. The EC is also perceived as being a higher risk, more complex investment 
environment than the US due to linguistic, cultural and market diversity, and substantial EC 
policy uncertainty relating to Japanese imports, transplant production, local content and 
competition in car distribution (block exemption). 
Currently many Japanese component companies are preoccupied with their US investments 
given limited investment and management resources. Moreover, the Japanese domestic 
business climate has changed somewhat since 1985 and fears of "kudoka" or the hollowing 
out of the Japanese economy have receded due to economic restructuring measures 
promoting "naijukakudai" or domestic led growth. Vehicle and component producers 
successfully rationalised to reduce breakeven points following the steep appreciation of the 
yen. These factors have tended to decrease the sense of urgency towards overseas 
investment. 
The extent of EC investment by Japanese autocomponent companies will therefore 
probably be markedly less than in the US and the pattern of investment will differ. There 
will be less greenfield investment due to fewer gaps in the EC component industry and 
highlighted sensitivity to investment friction issues. There will be fewer "linked" 
investments between Japanese car and component companies. There will be more 
technology transfers, joint ventures and acquisitions of established companies. 
Approximately half of Japanese component investments in the EC so far have been joint 
ventures, compared to only approximately 20% in the US. 
The differences in investment environments between EC and US are illustrated by the 
following typical statements by Japanese component producers... • 
" ... EC is more difficult .. .legal, cultural and linguistic diversity and lower availability of 
business information. Risk is higher ... trade and local content policies are still uncertain" 
" .. .Japanese vehicle producers are tending to source from local producers" 
" ... MITI are promoting joint ventures and technical collaborations rather than wholly 
owned greenfield investments" 
" joint ventures with local suppliers are preferred because volumes are too small, Nissan 
has a strict localisation policy and because we wanted to sell to European vehicle 
producers" . 
... and Japanese vehicle manufacturers: 
"We have a vigorous localisation policy and adopt a somewhat negative stance towards 
Japanese supplier investment. .. technical collaborations and joint ventures are encouraged 
when difficulties occur with local suppliers however" 
"Locally owned suppliers are preferred to Japanese joint ventures, which are preferred to 
100% Japanese investments". 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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The figure below shows the pattern of EC investment by Japanese autocomponent 
producers so far. 40% of the fifty or so investments so far relate to the UK. Japanese 
component producers interviewed explained their preference for the UK by the following 
factors: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
concentration of transplant production by Nissan, Toyota, and Honda in UK 
low labour costs 
English language 
stable labour relations in recent years 
positive central and local government attitudes . 
The EC investment activity of Japanese component companies represents not only a threat 
but also a significant opponunity for EC producers to improve competitiveness by entering 
into joint ventures and adopting best practice in relation to quality management, 
manufacturing process, logistics and new product development (as will be described later). 
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TECHNOLOGY AND R&D 
The European automotive industry has a relatively strong position in advanced automotive 
product technology, which is reflected in its relatively high Research and Development 
(R&D) ex nditure both corn ared to the US and Ja an: 
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As a weighted average proportion of sales, total industry spending on R&D in the 
European Community (including not only Germany and France, but also the other key 
countries such as the UK, Italy, and Spain) is around 4%, compared to 3.5% in Japan and • 
a slightly lower figure in the US. These estimates include spending throughout the value 
chain - at both the vehicle producers and the independent component producers. The level 
and relative importance of the R&D expenditure by component companies in the EC is 
greater than that in the US and to, a lesser extent, in Japan. However, as will be explained 
later, the European industry is less effective at translating strong basic product technology 
into rapid new model introductions, because of structural problems in the new product 
development process between OEMs and component suppliers. 
Car manufacturers are trying to enhance product appeal and status by incorporating 'high-
tech' component systems. This trend can be enforced through legislation (eg catalysts), 
demanded by market forces/consumers (eg ASR/ABS) or driven by competitive pressures. 
"High-tech" innovations will have a significant impact on the European supplier base. 
New entrants are emerging as diverse technologies from outside the core automotive supply 
structure are adapted for use in automotive applications (eg electronic communications, 
multiplexing). The number of suppliers available to vehicle manufacturers is limited by the 
high investment requirement in new technology and consequent barriers to entry. New 
technology based systems may result in established automotive suppliers being forced out 
of the industry as products fail to match the needs of future car models. 
Electronics will become an integral part to most mechanical systems within a vehicle by the 
end of the decade, and will also add totally new systems: 
• Almost all new petrol engines will have electronic fuel systems. Emissions 
control legislation means that 98% of cars will have fuel injection by 1995 and the 
use of engine management systems (EMS) will increase rapidly. 
• Anti-lock braking (ABS) is one of the fastest growing examples of all 
electronic/mechanical system with 40% fitment expected by 1995. 
• Air conditioning is part of the drive for greater comfort and is expected to 
penetrate into small and medium cars. By 2000 80% of air conditioning will have 
electronic controls. 
• Steering systems will incorporate Electronic Control Units (ECU) by the mid-
1990s. 
• Semi-active suspension will increase penetration particularly in high-
performance models. 
• Instrumentation and displays will incorporate electronics such as LCD's, head 
up displays, electronic (doppler effect) speedometers. · 
• Driver/road interface systems may show some use by the end of the 1990's. 
• Passive restraint systems such as air bags and intelligent seat belts will 
increasingly be adopted. 
• Multiplexing is likely to be adopted in the 1990s as systems protocols are 
developed and offers many advantages: 
Systems reliability 
Reduced harness size 
Lower installation costs 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Diagnostic capabilities 
Systems integration 
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Higher informational capacity 
Greater ease of customisation . 
The expected rate of penetration of these new high technology components is shown 
below. 
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The following display shows, based on assembler and supplier interviews, anticipated 
growth rates for selected high tech components. The EC industry is expected to play a key 
role in this area both because of the imponance of leading luxury car producers and the 
strong existing position of EC companies. 
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Environmental issues are a key driver in technological change and legislation can play a role 
in putting local component producers in an advantageous competitive position, forcing 
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producers to develop new technologies or to use new materials, as shown by these 
examples: 
• Pressure on vehicles to be fuel efficient has led to increased usage of plastics and 
other light materials to reduce weight and drag coefficient. Possible 
environmentally related taxes on fuel consumption or C02 emissions would 
accelerate these pressures. 
• Recycling issues are also causing plastic to be examined more closely. Major 
OEMs now demand suppliers to put forward a recycling procedure prior to adopting 
a new plastic part. 
• Recycling to lower grade products is possible (eg Fiat Tipo tailgate waste goes to 
make floor tiles). 
• Noise emissions are being dealt with by adopting polymers to suppress and 
shield engine noise (encapsulation). 
• Emissions legislation has resulted in new materials developments for safety at 
work (styrene emissions, water based paints). 
• CFC-free foaming agents are now required by auto manufacturers for seating 
systems. CFC refrigerants in air conditioning systems will be replaced by the mid-
l 990s. 
• Safety of cars has led to non-toxic materials being required. 
• Incineration for energy recovery is also viable (DowNoest-Alpine). 
• Etc. 
Increased technological content of components will, as indicated above, shift the locus of 
R&D product development and systems assembly increasingly to suppliers and will require 
a higher degree of skills in product development. Some of the competitive implications of 
these trends are discussed in later sections. 
FIN AN CIAL PERFORMANCE 
European component manufacturers have improved their financial performance since 1984 
until the current downturn. However, compared to the US and Japan, the record of 
European producers has been mixed: European producers have traditionally 
underperformed on key parameters. The improvements in recent years have now brought 
profitability up to that of Japanese competitors although it is still behind significantly in the 
underlying indicators of basic competitiveness • stock turns and labour productivity. Within 
Europe, no country stands out as performing significantly better on all counts, although 
France has experienced the most significant overall improvement. 
In measuring financial performance, the study pursued two main objectives: 
• To understand the current financial position of the European industry and its recent 
evolution. 
• To analyse parameters of financial performance which permit an understanding of the 
competitiveness of the European industry at an aggregate level. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
19 
In order to achieve these objectives, financial comparisons of component and vehicle 
suppliers were built on the largest possible sample of companies. The size of the sample 
varied across countries (it included 300 companies in France, 120 in the UK, 35 in 
Germany, 230 in the US and 70 in Japan). Country averages have been calculated by 
taking the weighted average of individual producer's data. We have relied on several data 
sources, such as ICC (UK), Jordans and direct information from companies(FRG), Value 
Line (USA), SESSI and FIEV in France and the Japan Auto Pans Industries Association 
(JAPIA). The Japanese sample accounts for 64% of total autocomponents production and 
covers most large companies. 
In the period through 1988, component suppliers' profitability in Europe has increased 
significantly, particularly in the UK and France. This relates both to return on sales and 
assets. The following exhibit shows the increase in European asset profitability: 
OMPARISON OF AUTOCOMPONENT COMPANIES PROFITABILITY 
Return 
(PBIT) .. 
on net assets 
(%) 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
France 
~-
~----------------1 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
*Profit before interest and taxes 
Source: ICC, Jordans, FIEV. Value Line, JAPIA 
10,U?~tl 
EC profitability has increased in absolute terms and relative to US and Japanese industries. 
In the above display the successful West German industry appears to have relatively low 
profitability. The profit figures after extraordinary items and reserve movements for 
Germany may, however, understate relative profitability for that country. The following 
graph shows that the underlying operating profitability of the German industry before 
reserves has been higher than in France, US or Japan: 
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Italy and Spain have been excluded due to insufficiency of publicly available data. 
However, surveys carried out by vehicle manufacturers in Italy indicate that returns in that 
country have been relatively high in recent years compared to other European and non • 
European autoparts industries. 
In addition to asset and sales profitability, cash flow was analysed in a comparative 
perspective in order to assess the industries' ability to invest in product development and 
manufacturing processes. The following chart shows that the Japanese industry has been a 
stronger cash generator in past years than the European one, indicating strong underlying 
competitiveness. 
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Competitiveness was further analysed by looking at key productivity indicators, such as 
labour productivity and stock turnover. Thes.e two measures are correlated and intimately 
connected to operational competitiveness. Japan shows very high levels of labour 
productivity: 
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Japanese labour productivity is between 1.6 and 2.5 times higher than European 
productivity. If value added per employee is analysed, the gap between Europe and Japan 
wide~s even funher. Despite relatively high hourly labour costs, Japan has managed to 
contll;1n labour costs at a constant 20% of sales over the last five years, significantly lower 
than m ~urope. Japan achieved very high rates of productivity growth, averaging 6.1 % 
p.a., whilst growth in Europe was generally lower at 3.6% in the German industry and 
3.7% among British companies. French component producers have recently matched or 
exceeded Japanese growth rates at 8.5% pa. 
On another key measure of competitiveness, stock turnover, Japanese component and car 
companies perform significantly better than European ones. On average, Japanese 
component producers' stock turnover (Sales/materials, work-in-progress, finished goods 
stocks) is currently 2lx, whilst European levels are roughly one-third that level. 
Vehicle Manufacturers Component Producers 
X 25 X 25 
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us 
10 10 EC 
5 EC 5 
-us 
0 0 
84 85 86 87 88 84 85 86 87 88 
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This measure is a crucial one, since it reflects adoption of Just-in-Time systems and the 
degree of sophistication of manufacturing processes and systems of the two industries. As 
will be pointed out later, significantly higher stock turnover among Japanese companies is 
the result of a manufacturing approach which implies higher productivity, quality and the 
ability to deliver products to much shoner lead times. Not only are Japanese companies 
achieving much higher stock turns than European ones, but they are also improving faster. 
The above chart also illustrates that superior performance is not limited to the components 
manufacturers but applies also to the car manufacturers. 
The pattern of financial performance of European vehicle manufacturers is very similar to 
that of component manufacturers. European car and LCV manufacturers have shown high 
and improving profitability, whilst fundamental indicators of competitiveness remain weak. 
Profitability grew rapidly during the 1980s to exceed US and Japanese profitability: 
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However, as in the component industry, the underlying competitiveness of the Japanese car 
industry is strong. Labour productivity is between 3.5 and 5 times higher than in European 
countries, whilst stock turnover is 3 times higher than the European average as mentioned 
earlier. 
The comparison of financials of both car manufacturers and component suppliers indicates 
the relatively low labour productivity and stock utilisation of the European industry - and 
suggests that higher performance in the Japanese car industry has not been achieved by 
shifting costs and stocks into other parts of the value chain. In fact, a comparison of 
• 
profitability between the car manufacturers and their suppliers indicates that in Japan the • 
levels and direction of profits move together, whilst they are dissimilar and diverging in US 
and Europe: 
THE PROFIT ABILITY OF THE COMPONENT SECTOR IS LOWER THAN THAT OF 
VEHICLE PRODUCERS IN EUROPE AND THE US 
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This suggests a high degree of cooperation between component manufacturers and their 
suppliers in Japan. Improvements in performance are pursued together and gains and 
reductions in profitability seem to be shared. The philosophy of "unmei kyodotai" ("shared 
destiny") is reflected in the concrete sharing of operating and financial gains in Japan . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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In contrast, in Europe and the US vehicle producers are consistently more profitable than 
component suppliers. This may reflect the relative bargaining strength of the OEMs relative 
to a fragmented supplier base and purchasing strategies aimed to a large extent at obtaining 
low prices . 
Overall there is no significant difference over time between total industry profitability levels 
in Europe and Japan. The decrease in profitability in 1986-88 in Japan reflected 
strengthening of the Yen; profitability is known to have recovered in 1989-90 to similar 
levels to those in the EC. This implies that the Japanese industry was passing on its gains 
in competitiveness (in terms of labour productivity and stock turns) in competitive pricing 
and investments in expansion abroad. 
The study also analysed financial performance of auto components companies as a function 
of size and product area focus. The following diagram suggests that there is no 
relationship, among UK producers of automotive components, between company size and 
profitability: 
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The industry shows a significant degree of of fragmentation; it is one where companies 
compete on many different variables across the different product groups. Smaller 
companies can achieve very high levels of profitability whilst larger companies tend to 
converge around industry average levels of profitability. 
Different product segments show significantly different levels of profitability and 
performance. In the case of the UK, return on net assets ranges from 5% (for internal 
engine components) to 30% for engine cooling components. Within each product group, 
financial performance also varies widely across producers. Return on net assets ranges 
from -25% to more than 40% in most categories. 
DIAGNOSIS OF COMPETITIVENESS 
The analysis of financial performance indicated the relative weakness on key competitive 
indicators of the European industry compared to Japan. It is important to understand what 
underlies the large differences observed in labour productivity and stock turnover . 
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Competitiveness in the automotive components industry is based on four major factors 
which are interdependent: 
Costs 
Innovation, Logistics, 
speed and ~--+--~ production 
product variety variety 
Quality 
These four basic dimensions are connected to two essential underlying elements: 
Flexible, reliable manufacturing processes, and 
• Effective design and development processes. 
Flexible and reliable manufacturing processes have a direct impact on product costs, 
quality, asset productivity and the ability to handle variety in the manufacturing process 
without cost penalties. They also reduce the need for high overheads to control the 
manufacturing system. Effective design and development processes permit faster model 
introductions and variety through lower design cycle times, and imply the ability to reduce 
• 
engineering overhead. Faster development cycles also mean the capability to redesign and • 
reduce further the costs of products. 
In order to understand the factors determining significant cost and productivity differences 
between European and Japanese producers, BCG analysed performance of European, US 
and Japanese autocomponent producers at the detailed plant level for a range of different 
types of components. The analysis included costs, quality, innovation and competitiveness 
in logistics. 
COST COMPETITIVENESS 
Japanese plants have, across a great number of product groups, a significant cost advantage 
compared to European and US factories. The table below shows the detailed analysis of 
competitiveness in forged automotive components (BCG compared normalised average 
total cost for 5 types of automotive forgings across 14 companies). The diagram shows that 
Japanese costs were on average 20% lower than their European and US competitors'. 
When costs were analysed in detail, the analysis showed that overhead labour was a large 
proportion of total cost and the largest component of any Japahese cost advantage: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Component 
Tubular stabilizer 
Solid stabilizer 
Connecting rod 
Spindle 
Source: BCG 
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OST COMPARISONS FOR 
AUTOMOTIVE FORGINGS 
Comparison 
Japanese cost 
advantage (%) 
Japan v US 33 
Japan v US 28 
Japan v EC 26 
Japan v US 22 
Japan v EC 8 
Japan v EC 20 
Japan v US 28 
Japan v EC 11 
Proportion of cost 
advantage due to lower 
overheadlabour(0/o) 
44 
65 
39 
80 
65 
36 
45 
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In the case of forged components, analysis showed that Japanese direct labour productivity 
was twice as high as in European plants, whilst indirect labour or overhead productivity 
was two and a half times higher. BCG investigated factors potentially explaining such 
productivity differences, such as product complexity and scale. Analysis showed that the 
cost advantage enjoyed by Japan was !lQ1 due to these factors. Nor was it due to higher 
capital intensity of Japanese plants. Factors which affected labour and stock productivity 
most were machine utilisation and uptime, faster production cycles and lower scrap and 
rework rates. 
BCG also analysed other product groups, such as car seats, where Japanese manufacturers 
enjoyed a 10% total cost advantage, mostly due to higher indirect labour productivity and 
significantly lower stock levels: 
JAPANESE SEAT SUPPLIERS HAVE LOWER STOCK LEVELS THAN US AND 
EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS 
Finished 
Goods 
Stock 
3C.---------------
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(days) 1c 
• Average stock levels of finished seats, covers and fabric for 11 companies 
Source: BCG 
26 
Superior Japanese performance in this product category was due mainly to the following 
aspects: 
• 
• 
JIT seat systems supply from dedicated, co-located plants; 
Optimised plant layout for materials flow; 
• Multimachine manning to maximise machine utilisation and flexibility; 
• Stable, long-term relationship with supplier, with long history of mutual efforts at 
cost reduction; 
• Multi-skilled workforce and team working, leading to lower overheads; 
• Etc. 
Japanese automotive lighting manufacturers also appear to have a significant cost advantage 
over US and EC suppliers. Again, the cost advantage in Japanese plants was mainly due to 
higher indirect labour productivity ( on average a factor of 4 times higher) and direct labour 
productivity (twice as high in Japan than in Europe). This resulted in an overall cost 
advantage of about 30 percent (the following graph displays an overall cost structure 
comparison ): 
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The detailed analysis of competitiveness of a variety of different automotive component 
products confirmed the relative weakness of European manufacturers shown by the overall 
industry financials. Common to all the product groups analysed was the relatively low 
labour productivity and related cost disadvantage which was mainly due to low productivity 
of indirect labour and overheads, independent of plant size and volumes per product family 
as shown below: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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APANESE PLANTS HAVE HIGHER INDIRECT LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY THAN 
US AND EUROPEAN PLANTS ACROSS A WIDE RANGE OF AUTOCOMPONENT 
TYPES 
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Labour productivity and stock turnover are closely related and are both driven by and 
indicators of the overall manufacturing approach. The exhibit below indicates how the two 
variables tend to improve simultaneously from one year to the next at the aggregate national 
level: 
EUROPEAN AUTOCOMPONENT PRODUCERS HA VE RELATIVELY LOW 
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The European autocomponents industry, especially in France and Germany. has been 
improving steadily along both dimensions, but the competitive gap remains as the Japanese 
continue to sustain rapid progress. Japanese cost and productivity advantages can be 
attributed to the manufacturing approach. This manufacturing approach is characterised by 
the following three main aspects: elimination of unexpected events, continuous 
improvement of the system and full engagement of the organisation. 
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The Japanese auto industry derives considerable benefits from the widespread adoption of 
Just-in-Time logistics based on synchronised production and delivery between suppliers 
and customers. Synchronised production can lead to: 
• Lower inventory levels and costs 
• Lower costs due to less requirements for space and indirect costs related to 
materials handling, scheduling, etc 
• Reduced lead times 
• Greater flexibility and responsiveness to demand 
• Lower scheduling overheads 
• Improved problem visibility and hence resolution, leading to improved quality 
• Improved supply chain coordination 
• Removal of phase lags in stock and production cycles. 
A very large proportion of EC autocomponents companies claim to be using TIT logistics as 
is illustrated by the following display based on a survey of over 400 companies carried out 
durin this stud : 
VER 4 AUTOCOMPONENT COMPANIES CLAIM TO BE USING 
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However, stock turns are a key indicator of the effective adoption of the JIT approach and 
Japan outperfonns Europe on this dimension at both levels of the chain: 
Japan 
UK 
France 
Gennany 
us 
24.2 X 
5.2 X 
11.2 X 
11.2 X 
12.0 X 
21.5 X 
5.5 X 
8.9 X 
7.0 X 
4.9 X 
It was also pointed out previously that the gap between Japan and EC countries is 
increasing, given in the very fast rates of inventory turnover improvement in Japan. The 
evidence on stock turns contradicts the apparent adoption of nT revealed in the survey. 
When analysed in detail, however, the majority of supply relationships described as JIT are 
extremely limited in scope, and are frequently based on the creation of buffer stocks close 
to the assembly plant. Such arrangements prompt an understandably pessimistic attitude by 
suppliers: "JIT means assemblers requiring us to maintain 5-10 days safety stock at our 
own expense .. JIT is an unwelcome attempt to force us to take on local storage facilities" 
are typical supplier comments. There are, however, an extremely limited number of 
successful JIT relationships (in the true sense of synchronous manufacture) to be found in 
Europe. In the table below, we list all the examples identified during the study: 
Countrv OEM Supplier Component 
Gennany BMW Schmidt Seats 
- Carpets 
- Bumpers 
Daimler Benz Keiper Recaro Seats 
Audi Schmidt Seats 
France Renault Epeda Bertrand Faure Seats 
- Bumpers 
Citroen Epeda Bertrand Faure Seats 
UK Nissan Ikeda Hoover Seats, Interior trim 
Nissan Yamato Structural pressings 
Calsonic Exhaust silencers 
Rover TRW Camgears Suspension modules 
Spain Renault Epeda Bertrand Faure Seats 
Portu2al Renault Ereda Bertrand Faure Seats 
There are several obstacles to the implementation of nT logistics in the EC automotive 
industry, such as lack of geographic proximity, the predominance of components vs 
systems sourcing in Europe, a relatively high incidence of labour disputes in some EC 
countries, the absence of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) systems and the fragmented 
structure of the industry . 
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nT logistics are generally thought to require a supply distance less than 2 hours or 50 km, 
whilst EC suppliers are often geographically dispersed. Geographical obstacles are not 
insurmountable, however, given that there are major areas of concentrated automotive • 
activity within the EC: 
• Turin (Italy); 
• West Midlands (UK); 
• Stuttgart (Germany); 
• Paris (France); 
• Etc. 
Funhennore, JIT is more economically attractive for bulky assemblies like_ seats than 
individual components because of high transpon and stock holding costs. The 
simultaneous establishment of JIT for many components is less feasible than the JIT 
sourcing of fewer component systems. JIT implementation is therefore facilitated by moves 
towards greater systems outsourcing. 
Close cooperation is essential for success since suppliers often need to invest in "doorstep" 
plants, systems and require dedication of management resources. Successful JIT is based 
on the optimisation of the whole supply chain from materials procurement for component 
manufacture through to vehicle assembly, and there is a need to communicate technical and 
managerial know how between suppliers and car manufacturers. European supplier - OEM 
relationships have been traditionally based on short term contracts and multiple and 
competitive sourcing by OEMs with frequent supplier switching. There is a relatively low 
degree of mutual dependence leading generally to limited mechanisms for cooperation. 
European car manufacturers typically strive to have competitive supply for parts wherever 
possible and minimise involvement in suppliers' internal affairs, whilst single OEM 
dedication is feared by suppliers for the overdependence it implies. In contrast, Japanese 
OEMs coordinate campaigns aimed at improving efficiency and productivity throughout the • 
entire value chain. 
Several steps can be taken to facilitate the improvement of logistical competitiveness. These 
include the reform of adversarial attitudes through the promotion of long term contracts, 
and single sourcing. Producers must address whole value chain competitiveness and aim at 
synchronised manufacture between suppliers and assemblers rather than just frequent 
delivery, which has often resulted in only extra buffer stocks. There is a need to 
reconfigure the supply structure increasingly through: 
• Systems outsourcing, 
• Doorstep sub-assembly plants, and 
• Fewer direct suppliers. 
At the same time it is necessary to establish channels for technical/managerial 
collaboration through supplier associations and staff exchanges. Just-in-time know how 
needs to be assimilated based on successful EC and Japanese examples and joint ventures 
with Japanese suppliers. The increased harmonisation of EDI protocols can funher 
contribute to the adoption of JIT systems. 
COMPONENTS QUALITY 
The analysis of components quality focused on the more quantifiable aspects of quality. 
The study analysed component reliability based on the observation of breakdowns, cost of 
maintenance and repairs and average life. It measured quality of Japanese, EC and US 
component manufacturers. This was done at different levels: firstly we compared overall 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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car quality (% breakdowns over a year, cost of on-going maintenance and repairs). This 
analysis was based on a sample of 86 car models and 21 makes sold on the European 
market. Furthermore individual component quality was analysed based on repair record by 
component type (based on a sample of 306 models sold on the US market). This 
comparative analysis was performed for 17 "trouble spots". BCG also analysed the 
average life of selected components. 
The analysis of overall car breakdowns showed that Japanese cars suffer fewer 
breakdowns than even the best European competition, on average, only 2.8% of Japanese 
cars in the European market suffered breakdowns in a given year, compared to 4.8% of 
German cars, 5.6% of UK manufacturers' cars, 6% of Ford's and GM's European 
production, 7.2% of French cars and 10.2% of Italian cars. 
The superior breakdown performance of Japanese cars compared to European cars was 
corroborated by the analysis of the repair record by individual trouble spots. The following 
diagram shows the relative repair record of Japanese, EC and US cars by functional 
component family. The analysis indicates that Japanese components have a significantly 
superior repair record than their EC and US competitors in most product groups: 
OMPARISON OF REPAIR RECORD BY PRODUCT GROUP 
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Relatively low performance does not imply failure only at the component level, since 
trouble spots can reflect either component integrity, system problems or poor assembly . 
The above analysis is based on a US sample which includes a high proportion of high 
value European competitors. One can assume that the differences between Japanese and EC 
components would be wider if a broader sample of European cars were to be taken. 
The picture of lower breakdown performance per trouble spot- is confirmed by the analysis 
of individual component life expectancy in the European market: 
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On average the Japanese industry has the highest country performance, but individual 
European manufacturers, notably Mercedes Benz, still achieve the highest quality/durability 
ratings. 
The majority of European vehicle manufacturers have acknowledged the performance gap 
and are beginning to implement programs to improve quality. Fiat for example believes that 
quality is affected by the structure and nature of supplier relationships and is reducing the 
number of suppliers and entering longer term contracts: currently each component is 
supplied by 2-3 firms under annual contracts. The goal is now to outsource 80% of 
component requirement to one supplier for up to 5 years. According to Fiat this scheme 
"should allow the component manufacturer to improve its quality, and Fiat to improve the 
system by working in greater cooperation with its (fewer) suppliers" . Volkswagen is 
following a very similar approach: "If we want to improve the quality of our product, we 
will have to change the number of products supplied by any single supplier and go 
selectively to longer term relationships". Ford has introduced a supplier cenification 
scheme which is mainly focused on product quality and uses fully documented absolute 
quality standards (QlOl). A growing proponion of suppliers are achieving this absolute 
standard and Ford pursues the objective to source from cenified suppliers only. The QlOl 
standard may be supplemented in the future by a wider scheme, encompassing delivery, 
management quality, design capability, etc. 
Although the schemes followed by European vehicle manufacturers are likely to yield 
significant improvements, they seem insufficient by themselves to generate forms of 
cooperation between suppliers and vehicle manufacturers which will in the future assure 
that continuous improvements in quality are pursued by the whole automotive value chain. 
Japanese observers of the European automotive scene comment that the approach taken by 
European vehicle manufacturers to improve their quality is perhaps still excessively 
contractual instead of being based on a philosophy of close cooperation: "The European 
approach is heavily documentation based, more precise than any Japanese equivalent; a 
reflection of a legalistic - contractual mentality. Japanese systems are more vague, 
evolutionary, and emphasize a problem solving approach ... Japanese suppliers achieve 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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actual tolerances 3 or 4 times finer than those stated on engineering drawings. Suppliers are 
committed to meeting unspecified future requirements as appropriate." 
Data over the last 10 years from the UK market show that the average quality of cars in 
oper~tion is steadily improving; the number of faults and problems experienced has 
declined at a rate of approximately 5% pa over the period. Clearly, continuous 
improvements in quality of this order of magnitude will be needed by producers just to 
maintain current relative position; higher rates will be needed to close the present gap with 
Japan. 
COMPETITIVENESS IN INNOVATION 
Technology and the ability to manage the product development process are the key elements 
of competitiveness in innovation. The EC industry has a number of areas of technological 
strength, such as ABS and EFI. These strengths are based upon a number of underlying 
factors, such as a strong engineering industry. The EC industry also benefits from the 
presence of specialist, high value vehicle manufacturers and the existence of large 
independent component manufacturers with significant R&D capability. However, 
competitiveness in vehicles and components is also dependent upon product development 
capabilities such as fast development cycles, the ability to sustain high variety and the 
effective management of development processes between vehicle manufacturers and 
suppliers. Vehicle market maturity mean that developmental capabilities are increasingly 
important in order to respond rapidly to the requirements of an increasing number of 
consumer segments. 
Technology: 
In a comparative perspective the EC, the US and Japan all have areas of technological 
advantage in automotive components. The EC has a strong technological position in 
products such as continuously variable transmissions, antilock brakes, electronic fuel 
injection, automotive electronics, constant velocity joints, water-based paints, etc. On the 
other hand, Japan is thought to have a technological advantage in products such as 
turbochargers, multivalve engines, ceramics, four wheel steering, memory seats, etc. It 
appears that in terms of basic product technology neither Japan nor the EC has clear overall 
superiority. 
European strength is reflected in the European licensing record to Japan. EC component 
producers have granted as many licenses as the US, which has long ties with the Japanese 
industry, especially through shareholding such as GM/Isuzu, Ford/Mazda. The following 
exhibit shows currently active technology licences to the major Japanese autocomponents 
producers by country of origin. European manufactures are key technology providers to 
Japan with Germany, the UK, and Italy playing the key roles: 
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URRENT TECHNOLOGY LICENCES TO 142 MAJOR JAPANESE 
AUTOCOMPONENT PRODUCERS 
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COMPETITIVENESS IN PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT: 
• 
Undoubtedly, European producers have a strong position as far as key technological 
innovations are concerned and Europe is a key provider of such technology world-wide 
both through licences and export activities. However, competitiveness in product 
innovation is more and more based not on achieving technological breakthroughs, but on 
the ability to provide model specific features and the ability to compress the development 
cycles for new products. Such competitiveness depends on continual improvements in • 
product development cost and reduced development lead times. Successful product 
developers emphasise manufacturability and product quality. 
Faster and more productive development processes yield significant competitive 
advantages, since they imply the ability to respond rapidly to emerging market needs, eg 
based on environmental protection, safety requirements and consumer taste trends. Fast 
developers can reap the advantages of first entry, can exploit market niches (4x4 utility 
vehicles, 2 seater sports cars, for example), can 'experiment' in the market place rapidly 
introducing models or variants and adjusting, modifying, enhancing and withdrawing 
models according to market response. Rapid new product introductions can create 
sustainable differentiation in a mature market and enhance price realisation and market 
share. 
Moreover, increased variety and shorter product development cycles imply reduced 
downside risks for new model failures, given a smaller investment per new model the 
spreading of risk over a wider portfolio, and a lesser risk of being outdated by changing 
consumer needs or preemptive introductions of similar products by competitors. 
For all these reasons, we are of the finn belief that rapid new product development will be 
one of the most important competitive weapons in the automotive industry in the 1990s. It 
will be critical for European automotive producers together with their component suppliers 
to significantly improve their performance along this critical dimension of competition. 
Today model development cycles are typically significantly longer for European and US 
manufacturers than for Japanese ones: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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JAPANESE VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS HAVE MUCH SHORTER PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT TIMES THAN THOSE IN EUROPE OR THE US 
New 
Model 
Leadtime 
(Months) 1 Maximum Average Minimum 
Source: Clark et al (1987) 
Europe US Japan 
Japanese vehicle producers have set ambitious goals to bring down urther their 
development times during the 1990s, making it necessary for European producers to 
redouble their efforts if they are to significantly narrow the current gap. 
This faster new product development capability, combined with flexible manufacturing 
systems that allow greater product variety without cost penalties, have resulted in Japanese 
sustaining much larger product variety. Among volume producers, Japanese vehicle 
manufacturers produce 70% more basic models (defined in tenns of common platfonns) 
per million units than European ones. These figures relate to their home market; the full 
competitive impact of the Japanese variety weapon has not yet been felt in Europe, given 
the long logistics pipeline from Japan to Europe. With rapid growth of Japanese transplant 
production in the EC during the 1990s, we would expect to see a much greater use of 
variety tailored to European consumers' needs, as has recently begun to occur with the US 
transplants . 
Moreover, shorter model development cycles based on a fundamentally different process 
imply lower costs: Japanese OEMs expend less resources in new model development than 
EC vehicle manufacturers, measured in engineering hours. This difference is, according to 
studies led by K. Clark at Harvard, more than 3 1/2 times. However, Japanese product 
development is substantially more delegated to suppliers than in the EC. Two-thirds of 
product development in Japan is carried out by suppliers in the fonn of own or delegated 
"black box" design, whilst this proportion is around one-half in the EC. The gap in 
development productivity is, therefore, not wholly attributable to greater delegation of 
desi res onsibili to su liers in Ja an as illustrated in the followin dia : 
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Combined vehicle and component manufacturers' development effort is 60% lower in 
Japan than in Europe per new model introduced. Such differences are not explained by a 
lower degree of design novelty (eg "face lifts" vs "new model"), since Japanese new 
models contain more unique (over 80%) and fewer common and carryover parts than US • 
(with just over 60% unique parts) and EC competitors (with 70%). This links directly the 
fast model cycles of Japanese OEMs to requirements on their component suppliers for 
design cycle competitiveness. 
The above evidence indicates that the Japanese automotive and component industries 
achieve higher product development performance without spending more on R&D. This 
hypothesis is confinned by analysing R&D expenditure in the automotive and components 
industries: the weighted average of combined OEM and component manufacturers' R&D 
expenditure in Japan was 3.5% of sales in 1988, compared to 4% in the EC, as was 
illustrated earlier in this executive summary. 
The Development Process 
The compression of product development cycles frequently requires a major reorganisation 
of the development process. Typical measures include the establishment of multifunctional 
development teams, co-location of development resources, establishment of competitive 
time bench-marks, parallel processing of key elements of development such as design, 
manufacturability, marketability etc., minimisation of interruptions, "invisible support 
functions" (approvals, tests etc.) , and clear goal definition for the development process. 
(see G Stalk/f Hout, Competing Against Time, Macmillan 1990). 
In the automotive industry, successful product development is largely a function of how 
the division of labour between assemblers and component producers is approached in terms 
of the degree of delegation, and the nature of cooperation existing between car 
manufacturers and their suppliers. The following diagram depicts typical patterns of • 
component development in Japan and the EC: 
TYPICAL PATTERNS OF COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT DIFFER MARKEDLY 
BETWEEN EC AND JAPAN 
,.....--------------------
S...oo:BCG-
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The key characteristic of the European model of product development is that concept 
development and prcxluct design take place within the assembler and that supplier selection 
occurs subsequently based on competitive tendering largely on the basis of price. Then 
follows a phase of production prototyping including eventual design and price changes 
before final mass production. 
The Japanese model is typically based on establishing a supplier relationship within which 
the product development process takes place: supplier selection occurs at the beginning of 
the development process. Product development is largely delegated to the component 
producer. During concept development, target costs are defined jointly. Prototyping, 
testing and production preparation are performed by the same supplier, maximising 
manufacturability and opportunities for parallel processing and time compression. Prices 
are only fixed once manufacturing aspects are duly taken into account. 
The key difference between the European and Japanese models is that whereas the Japanese 
system appears to be based on underlying trust and cooperative attitudes, the European 
system is adversarial, reflected in competitive bidding and profitability differentials between 
suppliers and OEMs. The Japanese value chain shares costs and benefits, unlike in Europe 
(see above). The table below summarises key differences between the Japanese and 
European models of product development: 
Item EC Japan 
Supplier selection 
. Timing Late (post design) Early (concept stages) 
. Criteria Price, etc Development ability, etc 
. Number Several per model One per model 
. Term 1-2 years Model life 
Design source 
. Identity Frequently OEM Frequently supplier (black box) 
. Number Several One 
Price/cost 
• Timing Initial price fixed early Price fixed late 
• Method Competitive tender Target cost 
. Stability Price rises with design changes Continuous cost reduction 
. Ot>enness No exchan~e of cost information Full exchange of cost information 
Several advantages derive from the Japanese pattern of component development, the key 
ones being the following: 
• Economies of scale and experience in component development 
By delegating development to specialist suppliers 
• Design for manufacture 
- Design source is always component manufacturer 
Simultaneous (vs sequential in EC) optimisation of performance, cost and 
quality 
• Elimination of duplicated development effort 
- Between OEM and supplier 
Between suppliers 
• Incentive for supplier investment in R&D 
- Supply ensured during model cycle time 
Single sourcing per part 
Single design source(= supplier) 
• Collaborative cost reduction 
Value analysis and engineering 
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Transparency of cost infonnation 
Shared benefits. 
On the other hand, traditional European patterns of product development have discouraged 
investment and innovation , as reflected in the following representative comment of a major 
component producer: "We have frequently invested in development work and have not 
been awarded the supply contract or have only been given part of it. This has no net impact 
in market share terms but substantially reduces the efficiency of the overall supply 
system". European companies are making attempts to gradually move towards a more 
"Japanese" pattern of product development. Examples are Ford through the expansion of 
the QlOI scheme which is planned to cover design, quality, delivery and managerial 
issues. BMW is attempting to delegate more development responsibility to suppliers, and 
various other European OEMs have plans to increase the development responsibility of 
their suppliers. Although these moves are encouraging, very rapid progress in improving 
the product development process between OEMs and component producers in Europe will 
be needed to close the gap with Japan, given their ambitious goals for further reductions in 
product development cycles. 
ACTIONS TO IMPROVE COMPETITIVENESS 
Despite evidence of European excellence in a number of product areas in the automotive 
components industry, the EC industry is on the whole less competitive than the Japanese 
one by several measures. The Japanese autocomponent industry achieves: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Higher labour productivity, 
Higher quality, 
Higher stock turns, 
Faster delivery cycles, 
Faster design and development cycles, 
Higher design and development productivity, 
Higher variety, and 
In many cases, lower product cost . 
The EC industry critically requires to achieve improvements in its competitive position 
along all key competitive dimensions which are interrelated: 
THE DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF COMPETITIVENESS ARE CLOSELY INTERRELATED 
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~etailed .analyses indicated that the relatively poor competitive performance of the EC 
industry 1s not due to a lower level of capital investment, technological disadvantages or 
factor costs, but relates to lower operating efficiency in both manufacturing and product 
development. Action is required to improve operating capabilities and competitiveness 
within individual firms. Additionally, the industry will have to address issues relating to the 
relationship between companies and the overall industry structure. 
The European industry has staned to address the competitive challenge posed by the 
Japanese industry. The challenge is however major and its solution complex because 
actions and change have to occur at multiple levels. Actions are required at company, 
intercompany and industry levels. 
At the company level, enterprises must overcome the fragmentation of the different 
functions which is pervasive in most car companies in order to tackle supplier management 
issues. This requires the concerted effort of engineering, manufacturing and purchasing 
functions. At the component manufacturer level, management methods relating to JIT, 
decentralised responsibilities, shorter information loops and higher accuracy in 
manufacturing management are necessary to close the competitive gap. This requires major 
programmes for operational efficiency improvements and to build the capability of 
organisations to communicate and to coordinate without major indirect labour buildups. 
At the intercompany level, it is necessary to increase trust and mutualism to ensure longer 
term relationships aiming to improve product performance and at the same time ensure 
appropriate levels of profitability along the value chain. The industry needs to consider 
increasingly the entire value chain as the key competitive unit, which implies a lower 
number of suppliers and increased mutual investment in supply relationships by vehicle 
manufacturers and suppliers. Shorter information loops coupled with a gradually increased 
use of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) systems will be necessary in order to achieve 
synchronised production. Structural change towards fewer suppliers is necessary to 
achieve improvements, as pointed out above . 
The speed and extent of reform in the relationship between OEMs and component 
producers is limited by obstacles at company, intercompany and industry levels. Obstacles 
at company level include labour inflexibilities and the limited frequency of model change in 
Europe, which reduces opportunities for radical reform. The rigid functional barriers that 
characterise many typical European automotive companies are an important obstacle since 
the nature of the required change transcends the traditional scope of OEM purchasing 
departments. Change needed is: 
• radical rather than incremental., 
• strategic rather than operational, 
• requiring multifunctional/multidepanmental collaboration, 
• inconsistent with low status often afforded to purchasing departments. 
Intercompany level obstacles affect the prospects for change. Improving the 
competitiveness of the EC autocomponent industry requires fundamental changes in the 
nature and structure of the OEM/Supplier relationship: 
Change 
Supplier/ 
assembler 
relationships 
Structural 
change 
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Cooperative relationship 
I Long term contracts 
I Design delegation 
I More systems purchasing 
I Greater outsourcing 
I Fewer suppliers/part 
I Fewer direct suppliers 
Specifically, adversarial attitudes in the vertical chain are a severe handicap. The main 
obstacles are the unwillingness to incur risk through increased supplier/customer 
dependence. This leads to: 
• intra rather than inter value chain rivalry, 
• mutual distrust in relation to quality, delivery, loyalty, confidentiality, etc, 
• lack of openness with information. 
Funhermore, there is an absence of mechanisms for communication and cooperation 
between an OEM and its supplier base, such as are typical in Japan. These include supplier 
associations (grouping component suppliers to a given OEM), staff exchanges between 
personnel of OEMs and suppliers to facilitate transfer of experience and building of trust, 
and technical assistance programmes by the vehicle manufacturer to help suppliers adopt 
new manufacturing methods and improve productivity and quality. 
.. 
• 
Structural change is a crucial element to achieve improvements in competitiveness. EC • 
OEMs use many more direct suppliers than Japanese OEMs. As shown earlier, European 
car companies have between 800 and 2000 direct suppliers, whilst Japanese OEMs have 
between 160 and 300. EC OEMs are gradually reducing their number of direct suppliers by 
reducing the number of suppliers per part and increasing the number of parts supplied by 
individual suppliers. It is estimated that OEMs will shift from currently half of their 
components supplied by 2 or more suppliers to a pattern of 80% of parts supplied by one 
or two companies only. Increased systems purchasing has started for more recent car 
models in Europe and smaller suppliers have been eliminated. Other indicators of change 
are supplier certification schemes, common suppliers across several countries etc. The 
planned reductions will undoubtedly improve the ability to manage supplier relationships, 
but the issue remains as to whether the anticipated changes will be sufficient 
In addition to a larger number of suppliers, EC car manufacturers typically have a higher 
degree of vertical integration than Japanese OEMs, particularly if component divisions and 
subsidiaries are taken into account. On average, value added as a percent of sales for 
European OEMs is 46% without component subsidiaries and 56% including them; in 
contrast Japanese OEMs account for only 36% of total value added (the effective level of 
integration in Japan may be somewhat higher given financial _affiliation of a number of key 
suppliers). 
In Europe, OEMs are gradually reducing venical integration through the delegation of sub 
assemblies and increased systems purchasing, reexamination of the cost efficacy of internal 
manufacture, outsourcing where OEM technology has fallen behind and for parts with high 
labour content. Greater outsourcing would frequently imply systems purchasing, and 
facilitate improvements in supplier management on the pan of the vehicle manufacturer. • 
• 
... 
• 
• 
• 
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Great.er outsourci~g is also likely to be connected to the delegation of more tasks to 
suppliers, notably m the area of product development. European vehicle manufacturers are 
also increasingly outsourcing component systems rather than individual components, 
currently mainly in the area of seats, bumpers, suspension modules, pre-filled clutch 
hydraulics, door panels etc. Increased outsourcing of systems is also likely to be 
connected with longer-term relationships than currently. Today, one year contracts are the 
dominant form. It is estimated that three year contracts may account for half the supplier 
relationships by the mid-nineties. 
At the industry level, it is important to strengthen the institutions of the autocomponents 
industry, especially at the EC level to ensure effective cooperation with the vehicle industry 
institutions, to provide reliable information on the components industry and to ensure 
effective policy input at EC level. Industry level obstacles include a limited institutional 
basis for the coordination of the component industry at national and EC levels. The basis 
for cooperation between suppliers and vehicle manufacturers is currently weak. A lack of 
effective industry associations can represent a severe handicap in achieving required 
change. 
The industry is confronted with major challenges which require an effective industry 
cooperation and representation at national and EC levels. The current institutional 
framework has several inadequacies. At national level the sector institutions often achieve 
incomplete coverage of the industry in terms of product groups and companies. Key 
segments of the industry are not represented in some EC countries. Services to members 
are relatively limited in the area of statistics, research, policy development and education. 
At EC level there has previously been a lack of comparable industry data on key parameters 
such as production, consumption and employment. Problems of inconsistency, 
incompleteness and quality pervade information relating to the industry. In particular, trade 
data on components as currently produced is inconsistent with production data and at EC 
level there are severe problems of aggregation and accuracy under the harmonised 
nomenclature. It is important that efforts are undenaken to improve the quality of trade data 
at the EC level, in order to monitor the industry closely in the future in the context of the 
Single Market. 
The limited collaboration with vehicle manufacturers' bodies on issues of mutual 
imponance such as restructuring of OEM/supplier relationships, trade policy etc., is 
problematic. There is a need to work on a common protocol for electronic data interchange 
to facilitate adoption of JIT logistics and ordering/invoicing between vehicle manufacturers 
and autocomponent suppliers. Policy input at EC level has been limited and has lacked 
cohesiveness. 
In comparison, the Japanese components industry association (JAPIA) represents the 
Japanese autocomponents industry very effectively: 
• Permanent premises and secretariat 
• Separate from assemblers' association but in close cooperation 
• Extensive statistical and informational activities on trade, production, employment, 
R&D, financial results, overseas invesnnent 
• Good industry coverage (-75% total production) 
• Active discussion of policy issues. 
The institutional framework needs to be strengthened to suppon effons to improve industry 
competitiveness. The institutions of the sector should consider enhancing their capability to 
serve the component industry, to ensure comparable representativeness across countries, to 
address problems of information availability and comparability and to develop policy input 
and interface with EC institutions . 
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Actions are urgently needed to improve the EC industry's competitiveness. The following 
table summarises the main problems and possible solutions relating to competitiveness: 
COMPETITIVENESS 
Summary of main problems and possible solutions 
Competitive &Ip with Japan 
Cost, quality, product development 
OEM - supplier relalionship at c«e of problem 
Mutual ioaerest of boch parties to reform relationship 
ectlve a option o mo ern man actur1ng processes 
Management systems and proce~s 
Structure 
n sti tutional 
Fast product development 
Flexible manufacturing and JIT 
Increased outsourcing 
Systems sourcing 
Reduced number of direct suppliers 
Limited institutional support 
Inadequate informalion 
---t•~ Education, awareness, attitudes 
lnformalion dissemination 
OEM supplier 'clubs' 
OEM assiSlaDCe to suppliers 
---11•~ Training of management and workforce 
Japanese joint venlltres 
OEM led l'CSllllcturing 
---41•~ Supplier reconfiguration 
lnaeased resources 
Improved structures/interfaces 
Compared to the main competitive threat of the 1990s - the Japanese, the EC automotive 
• 
... 
• 
components industry has relatively low productivity, quality, and operating efficiency and • 
is not improving at high enough rates to match Japanese industry performance. The gap is 
significant and needs to be closed. The speed of product development is a key competitive 
variable and Europe lags Japan significantly. 
In order to close the competitive gap, in addition to entreprise specific programmes to 
effectively adopt modem, flexible manufacturing and new product development processes, 
there is a need for structural change towards fewer suppliers with enhanced systems 
capability, and changes in the OEM-supplier relationship. 
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